Preventing another Euro Area Crisis: EU Economic Governance ‘Six Pack’ – a case of too little, too late? Paper from the Colloquium: The Politics and Economics of the Euro Crisis, Institute for European Studies, University of Malta, 2 December 2011 by Catania, Moira
 
M o i r a  C a t a n i a  –  P r e v e n t i n g  E u r o  C r i s i s  
 
Page 1 
Institute for  
European Studies  
University of Malta 
  
      
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Preventing another Euro Area Crisis: EU Economic Governance ‘Six Pack’ – a 
case of too little, too late? 
 
 
Ms Moira Catania 
Institute for European Studies 
 
Introduction 
As part of the European response to the ongoing 
Euro crisis, the European Union (EU) has embarked 
on a process of reforms in order to strengthen 
economic governance in the Euro Area. This 
constitutes a long term process aimed at preventing 
further sovereign debt crises in the future. This paper 
deals with this preventive aspect of the European 
response to the crisis, and specifically with the EU 
economic governance ‘Six Pack’. 
 
Before assessing this legislative package, this paper 
outlines why fiscal discipline is important in a 
monetary union and reviews the framework for 
economic policy coordination and fiscal surveillance, 
which was in place before the crisis. 
 
Fiscal Discipline in a Monetary Union 
Political considerations determined the design of the 
Euro Area. Governments’ reluctance to surrender 
national competence in fiscal policy implied that the 
Euro Area was constructed with a common monetary 
policy but decisions on economic and fiscal policies 
remained at a national level. The Euro Area is thus 
different from other monetary unions, which have a  
fiscal federal structure, in that fiscal competence in 
the Euro Area remain largely at national level (De 
Grauwe, 2009).  
 
Due to the lack of common economic and fiscal 
policies, since the inception of EMU, there have been 
two conflicting objectives – the desire to retain 
flexibility in national policies whilst at the same time 
the need to maintain coordination and fiscal 
discipline given that, as the current crisis has clearly  
shown, the economic policies of one member state 
can have the negative spillover repercussions on the 
others. 
 
According to the optimum currency area theory, in a 
monetary union, stabilisation mechanisms are 
important to deal with asymmetric shocks (De 
Grauwe, 2009). In the EU, the central budget is small 
and inflexible, implying that it cannot be used for 
stabilisation purposes. This implies that some degree 
of flexibility is required in national fiscal policies so 
that governments can deal with shocks affecting only 
their country’s economy (Majocchi, 1999). How can 
fiscal discipline be maintained in a monetary union of 
Summary: 
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this kind? De Grauwe (2009) presents various 
arguments in this regard. Unsustainable fiscal policies 
in one member country can have negative spillover 
effects on other countries. In particular, if a country 
spends and borrows more, this will stimulate demand 
also in other members, especially in a single market 
such as the EU where economies of member 
countries are highly integrated. This could lead to 
inflationary pressures in the whole Euro Area, and as 
a result a restrictive monetary policy by the European 
Central Bank which would affect demand and 
borrowing costs of other members of the monetary 
union. Furthermore, the higher interest rate in the 
Euro Area would also cause the euro to appreciate, 
leading to a deterioration in the overall trade 
balance. De Grauwe (2009), Hallerberg (2004) and 
Heipertz and Verdun (2004), also argued that 
unsustainable fiscal positions in member countries 
could potentially lead to interference in the conduct 
of monetary policy as countries negatively affected 
by high interest rates could put pressure on the ECB 
to relax its monetary policy stance. According to De 
Grauwe (2009) it could also be argued that EMU itself 
could bring fiscal laxity. With flexible exchange rates, 
if a country pursues an unsustainable fiscal policy, it 
would face a higher risk premium because its 
currency would be expected to depreciate. Adoption 
of the single currency implied that financial markets 
could no longer impose this constraint of discipline 
through the exchange rate. However, De Grauwe 
(2009) also provides a counterargument to this line 
of thinking pointing out that countries participating in 
EMU could no longer monetise their debt. Thus, it is 
debatable whether participation in EMU brings less 
fiscal discipline or not.  
 
When EMU was launched, the fear of unsustainable 
fiscal positions in some member states outweighed 
the need for flexibility in national fiscal policies (De 
Grauwe, 2009). Convergence criteria were 
established for participation in the final stage of 
EMU, which included fiscal criteria. These required 
that government deficits are kept below three per 
cent of GDP whilst debt ratios were not to exceed 60 
per cent of GDP, unless they were declining and 
approaching this benchmark at a satisfactory rate. 
Eventually, all members who wished to join EMU 
were able to do so, and eleven participated in 1998 
while Greece joined in 20011. Some of these 
countries joined EMU despite very high levels of debt 
                                                          
1
 Only one prospective applicant to the Euro Area was refused 
entry – this concerned Lithuania in 2006 which was not 
considered to have met the convergence criteria due to a 
marginal breach of the criterion on inflation. At the same time, 
Estonia did not apply for euro area membership for the same 
reason, but eventually Estonia adopted the euro in 2011. 
and a number of them breached the 3 per cent 
deficit threshold as soon as the European economy 
slowed down again. EMU thus involved countries 
which did not share the same culture of fiscal 
discipline. Germany’s role was also crucial. Heipertz 
and Verdun (2004) argue that Germany had both 
economic and political reason to insist on rules for 
fiscal discipline after EMU: to ensure a strong and 
credible central bank and low inflation and to 
appease German opposition to EMU. A single 
currency without Germany was inconceivable and 
hence Germany was in a strong position to enforce 
its wishes on the other member countries.  
 
 
 
Economic Policy Co-ordination before the Crisis 
In this context, the Amsterdam European Council in 
June 1997 agreed on the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP) in order to regulate national fiscal policies after 
EMU membership. The SGP has a corrective arm, 
which involves the excessive deficit procedure, and a 
preventive arm, which concerns the medium term 
fiscal policy (European Commission, 2011). The 
corrective arm mainly requires members to keep 
their deficits below the three per cent of GDP 
threshold, with the eventual possibility of financial 
sanctions if they do not comply with the respective 
Council Recommendation to correct the excessive 
deficit (European Commission, 2011). The preventive 
arm requires members to achieve their medium term 
budgetary objective, which in general would be a 
broadly balanced budget over the business cycle. 
Members of the Euro Area are required to prepare 
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annual Stability Programmes2 which outline the 
medium term budgetary plan, and which are then 
assessed by the Council particularly to determine 
whether the country concerned is making sufficient 
progress towards its medium term budgetary 
objective (European Commission, 2011). The 
underlying idea underpinning the preventive arm is 
that if countries achieve their medium term 
budgetary objective, then they would have sufficient 
‘fiscal headroom’ in case of economic shocks, thus 
meeting the need for flexibility in national fiscal 
policies, outlined earlier.  
 
However, the current sovereign debt crisis has made 
it amply clear that the framework for fiscal 
surveillance in place in the Euro Area was not 
sufficient to ensure fiscal discipline. Important 
weaknesses of the SGP include a lack of transparency 
and problems of enforceability (Alves and Afonso, 
2007). In particular, financial sanctions can only be 
imposed at the discretion of the Ecofin Council 
through a qualified majority. However this implies a 
situation of judgers judging themselves, with finance 
ministers being reluctant to impose sanctions on 
other countries when in the future they themselves 
could very well be at the receiving end. Indeed, the 
financial sanctions provided for by the SGP were 
never imposed, resulting in the SGP being described 
as “a dog that would never bite” (Heipertz and 
Verdun, 2004: 778). This was the case with respect to 
the situation of France and Germany in 2003/4 where 
the Council decided to put the respective excessive 
deficit procedures in abeyance, rather than impose 
sanctions, a decision later overruled by the European 
Court of Justice and to the 2005 reform of the SGP 
(Alves and Afonso, 2007). At that time, the credibility 
of the SGP was weak with the then President of the 
European Commission, Romano Prodi, describing the 
Pact as ‘stupid’ since it was not flexible enough to 
allow countries to deal with the economic crisis 
(Alves and Afonso, 2007). The 2005 reform of the 
SGP resulted in a more flexible SGP and also 
increased the possibility of political judgement in the 
process, particularly as regards the factors that can 
be considered when deciding on whether an 
excessive deficit persists (Alves and Afonso, 2007).  
 
The framework for economic policy coordination 
amongst members of the Euro Area which was in 
place before the crisis started largely involved fiscal 
surveillance.  As regards structural economic reforms, 
only non-binding guidelines known as “Broad 
Economic Policy Guidelines” were agreed to.  These 
required member states to prepare national reform 
                                                          
2
 The other EU member states are required to prepare 
Convergence Programmes. 
programmes outlining their structural reform plans 
(Europa 2006).  This “soft” approach on structural 
reform occurred despite the importance of flexible 
labour and product markets as adjustment 
mechanisms in a single currency area in case of 
economic shocks. Nevertheless, and despite the 
thrust towards reform supplied by the Lisbon 
Strategy as from 2000, most member states made 
insufficient progress in terms of structural reforms 
(Allard and Everaert, 2010). 
 The ‘Six-Pack’ on Economic Governance 
Given these weaknesses, preventing another crisis in 
the Euro Area required a significant strengthening of 
the economic pillar of EMU. To this effect, a Task 
Force to the European Council was set up in March 
2010. This task force on economic governance was 
chaired by the President of the European Council, 
Herman Van Rompuy, and its members were mainly 
EU finance ministers. This Task Force presented its 
final report in October 2010 (European Council, 
2010). In the meantime, the European Commission 
presented its proposals for stronger economic 
governance in the Euro Area through six legislative 
proposals (which subsequently became known as the 
‘Six-Pack’) at the end of September 2010 (European 
Commission, 2011).  Intense negotiations on this 
package followed in the subsequent months in the 
EU institutions. The Lisbon Treaty had given new 
powers to the European Parliament in this policy 
area, and to some extent this was a new experience. 
Reaching an inter-institutional agreement was a 
difficult and lengthy process, given the different 
views held by member states in Council as well as by 
political groups in the European Parliament. The 
original target to reach agreement by June was not 
feasible and a final compromise agreement was 
achieved in September 2011. The ‘Six-Pack’ will enter 
into force by the end of 2011/beginning of 2012 
(European Parliament, 2011).3 
 
The ‘Six-Pack’ involves important reforms to the SGP 
(Buti and Larch, 2010). This includes stricter rules in 
the preventive arm, including a new rule based on 
expenditure developments to assess progress 
towards the medium-term budgetary objective. 
Furthermore, the reforms entail better enforcement 
of the preventive arm, including the possibility of 
imposing warnings, recommendations and also 
financial sanctions. Previously Council could only 
issue an opinion on countries’ medium-term 
budgetary plans. The SGP reforms included in the 
‘Six-Pack’ also affect the corrective arm. An 
important change is that it strengthens the focus on 
the debt levels of member states. As argued by De 
                                                          
3
 The EU Economic Governance ‘Six Pack’ entered into force on 
13 December 2011 
 
M o i r a  C a t a n i a  –  P r e v e n t i n g  E u r o  C r i s i s  
 
Page 4 
Grauwe (2009), since the aim of the SGP is to prevent 
members of the Euro Area from exposing themselves 
and others to the risk of default, surveillance should 
focus on debt levels rather than on the deficit. 
Furthermore, the reformed SGP comprises a 
numerical benchmark for debt reduction. This is a 
welcome reform since previously what constituted a 
satisfactory reduction of the debt ratio was open to 
interpretation. The ‘Six-Pack’ also provides for 
stronger financial sanctions under the corrective arm, 
which sets in early in the process. This is a significant 
development since previously sanctions could 
potentially be imposed only after a country has 
repeatedly failed to take the necessary action and 
after subsequent warnings by Council (European 
Commission, 2011).  
 
In the fiscal field, the ‘Six-Pack’ also involves other 
important reforms, namely provisions for better fiscal 
statistics, including the possibility of fines if member 
countries misreport data on their deficit and debt as 
well as measures to strengthen the professional 
independence of national statistics authorities 
(European Parliament, 2011). Another important 
development is the new directive on the national 
budgetary framework. For the first time, this 
directive makes specific requirements on the 
budgetary procedures in member states, including 
accounting systems, budgetary forecasting practices, 
fiscal relations between different levels of 
government, multi-annual perspective in the 
budgeting, more transparency (for example as 
regards contingent liabilities) as well as requiring 
governments to introduce national fiscal rules which 
are consistent with the Stability and Growth Pact 
(European Commission, 2011).  
 
The ‘Six-Pack’ also introduces for the first time a 
formal framework to detect macroeconomic 
imbalances and competitiveness problems. This 
includes a new excessive imbalance procedure which 
involves an early warning system based on a 
scoreboard of indicators. It also lays the legal grounds 
for preventive and corrective actions, including the 
possibility of financial sanctions (European 
Commission, 2011). 
  
Besides these strengthened and new aspects of 
surveillance, importantly the ‘Six-Pack’ also involves 
significant procedural reforms. One of the most 
notable changes is reverse majority voting, whereby 
a Commission recommendation will be considered as 
adopted unless a majority of members states in 
Council vote against it. This is an important 
development because it will significantly increase the 
automacity of sanctions and warnings in the SGP 
(European Parliament, 2011). Furthermore, on a 
procedural level, the ‘Six-Pack’ provides for 
significantly more oversight by the European 
Parliament, including public hearings (European 
Parliament, 2011). 
 
As highlighted earlier, the negotiations on the ‘Six-
Pack’ were long and difficult. Among the more 
contentious issues in the negotiations was that  
involving more automacity in warnings and sanctions. 
A group of countries, including France, were against 
the reverse majority voting, but the European 
Parliament resisted these efforts at watering down 
the reforms (European Parliament, 2011). The 
European Parliament also insisted on, and won the 
right for public hearings. Another contentious issue 
concerned the sources of macroeconomic 
imbalances, and specifically whether the focus should 
be only on countries with persistent and large current 
account deficits or whether countries with surplus 
positions on their current account, such as Germany 
and Netherlands, should also be monitored 
(European Parliament, 2011). Within the European 
Parliament’s political groupings there was also 
disagreement on whether the ‘Six-Pack’ contains too 
much focus on fiscal discipline, with the Progressive 
Alliance of Socialists and Democrats arguing that this 
came at the expense of growth and employment 
(European Parliament, 2011). 
 
Other EU Economic Governance Reforms 
Whilst negotiations on the ‘Six-Pack’ were taking 
place, other EU economic governance reforms were 
implemented, namely the European Semester and 
the Euro Plus Pact.  
 
The European Semester was actually part of the 
recommendations of the Task Force on Economic 
Governance (European Council, 2010). Agreement on 
the European Semester was achieved in September 
2010, (Council of the European Union, 2010) and this 
was the first part of the recommendations to be 
implemented as from 2011. The European Semester 
has now been integrated in the ‘Six-Pack’. The 
European Semester involves ‘upstream’ policy 
coordination and strengthening the EU dimension in 
national policy making. The process starts with the 
Annual Growth Survey prepared by the European 
Commission which gives broad guidance on priority 
actions at EU and national level and which member 
states must take into account when they prepare 
their Stability/Convergence Programmes and 
National Reform Programmes (European 
Commission, 2011). These programmes are then 
assessed by the Commission and Council by mid-year 
and on this basis, countries are then to prepare their 
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national budgets. This is a significant departure from 
the previous procedure where national budgets were 
assessed after they became law. Furthermore, the 
new process should increase coordination between 
budgetary and structural policies as these are now 
presented and assessed concurrently. Nevertheless, 
it should be pointed out that the implementation of 
the European Semester in 2011 was not 
unproblematic as the measures included in a number 
of programmes were rather vague. On the other 
hand, the Commission recommendations were more 
specific and included deadlines (Europa, 2011a), thus 
making them more enforceable. 
 
The Euro Plus Pact involves the agreement reached 
among the Euro Area member states as well as 
Bulgaria, Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and 
Romania, in March 2011, with the aim of improving 
economic policy coordination and improve 
competitiveness and avoid harmful macroeconomic 
imbalances (European Council, 2011a). The Pact 
concerns policy areas that fall under national 
competences, such as wage policy, pension reforms 
and tax policy coordination, and hence could 
constitute an important development in the 
improvement of economic policy coordination 
amongst the countries concerned. However, its 
enforceability may be weak because it involves 
national policy commitments, which are monitored 
politically, and a similar system based on peer 
pressure applied in the Lisbon Strategy had not been 
successful (Wyplosz, 2010).  
 
Throughout the course of 2011, the sovereign debt 
crisis in the Euro Area became more severe and 
broader with three countries (Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal) having been bailed out and intense 
financial market pressures building on Italy as well as 
Spain especially since summer. Indeed, the President 
of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso 
stated that the ‘European Semester and the six-pack 
legislation need to be strengthened further’ (Europa, 
2011b). In October 2011, the Commission issued a 
Communication ‘A Roadmap to Stability and Growth’ 
and important decisions were taken in the European 
Council and Euro Area Summit which met in that 
month. In particular, the governance of the Euro Area 
was strengthened. Whilst the Eurogroup had been 
integrated in the Lisbon Treaty, there had been no 
provision for meetings for the heads of state or 
government of the Euro Area members. This has 
been addressed with the establishment of the Euro 
Area Summit which will be held at least twice a year 
and which will have its own President (European 
Council, 2011b)4. Furthermore, stricter provisions for 
fiscal surveillance will start to apply, including ex-ante 
vetting of draft budgets and stricter monitoring of 
budget execution for countries subject to the 
excessive deficit procedure (European Council, 
2011b). Another development involves reinforced 
national fiscal frameworks, going beyond the 
requirements of the Directive included in the ‘Six-
Pack’. Euro Area member states agreed to implement 
the Directive in 2012, one year earlier than planned 
originally and to adopt stricter provisions including 
independent economic growth forecasts to be used 
as a basis for budgetary projections and a 
commitment to introduce national fiscal rules 
embedding the provisions of the SGP (European 
Council, 2011b) in national law. Furthermore, 
economic policy coordination will be improved 
through an obligation to consult with the European 
Commission and other Euro Area members before 
the adoption of major fiscal or economic policy 
reform plans with potential spillover effects 
(European Council, 2011b). 
 
As the financial markets seemed to remain 
unconvinced of the effectiveness of the European 
efforts to stem the crisis, pressures on sovereign 
bonds of certain Euro Area member states, in 
particular Italy, continued unabated. In this context, 
even more radical economic governance reforms 
were proposed by the European Commission in 
November 2011, which go beyond the requirements 
of the ‘Six-Pack’ and the measures announced in 
October. Two new regulations to strengthen 
budgetary surveillance in the Euro Area were 
proposed (Europa, 2011c). The first regulation 
concerns member states which are subject to an 
excessive deficit procedure and involves a common 
budgetary timeline and common budgetary rules 
(including independent macroeconomic forecasts and 
independent fiscal councils to monitor the 
implementation of national fiscal rules), stronger ex-
ante assessment of national budgets by the European 
Commission and Council as well as graduated 
monitoring of implementation of fiscal plans. The 
second regulation applies to Euro Area member 
states which are receiving financial support or face 
severe financial stability difficulties and involves 
stronger monitoring and surveillance procedures. 
Concurrently with these proposed regulations, the 
European Commission has also presented a Green 
Paper with options for euro stability bonds. Indeed, 
stronger fiscal surveillance is considered as a pre-
                                                          
4
 Currently, the President of the European Council, Herman Van 
Rompuy has assumed this role, but in the future the president of 
the Euro Area Summit will be elected at the same time when the 
President of the European Council will be elected. 
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requisite to the introduction of Euro bonds in order 
to avoid moral hazard (Europa, 2011c). However, 
Germany continues to oppose the concept of Euro 
bonds (BBC, 2011), so that it is not clear what will be 
the way forward in this regard. 
 
Assessment of the ‘Six-Pack’ 
As highlighted earlier, the process to arrive at a 
compromise agreement on the ‘Six-Pack’ between all 
the EU institutions was long and complex. It took one 
whole year for an inter-institutional agreement to be 
reached, after six months of discussion in the Task 
Force and then in the European Council. Whilst 
financial markets want fast decisions, decision-
making in the EU has been slow and difficult. EU 
decision making involved different institutions and 
within each institution there were different views 
amongst the respective members. For instance, on 
automacity of sanctions and warnings there was 
disagreement between the European Commission, 
the European Parliament and Council as well as the 
European Central Bank (European Parliament, 2011), 
which although it was not directly involved in the 
decision-making process, was an important 
stakeholder. Then there were differing views within 
each institution, particularly amongst member states 
in Council and between different political groupings 
in the European Parliament (European Parliament, 
2011). By the time, agreement on the ‘Six-Pack’ was 
reached in September 2011, it was clear that the 
requirements of this legislative package were not 
ambitious enough and more reforms on economic 
governance were proposed while others were being 
designed. On this basis, I would conclude that the 
‘Six-Pack’ has been a case of ‘too late’ and ‘too little’. 
 
The EU has addressed the sovereign debt crisis in the 
Euro Area by taking measures, with one small step 
being taken each time. This has been the case not 
only in the economic governance reforms, but also in 
the establishment of the financial support 
instruments. In the different European Council 
meetings (May 2010, July 2011, October 2011), it was 
hoped that the measures taken would be sufficient to 
calm financial markets and ease the crisis. However, 
each time financial markets were not convinced and 
it was soon realised that the measures announced 
were not enough and more needed to be done. This 
situation reflects the fact that there is little appetite 
among member states for more integration in fiscal 
policy making (Pisani-Ferry, 2010). Member states do 
not want more centralisation in this policy area (Buti 
and Larch, 2010). This was also reflected in the 
negotiations on the ‘Six-Pack’, particularly the 
reluctance by some member states to concede to the 
reverse majority voting system (European 
Parliament, 2011). One may thus conclude that 
perhaps only such a gradual process of integration 
was feasible, with member states not willing to 
accept more fiscal integration than the minimum 
necessary to address the crisis. 
 
The reforms which were announced in October and 
November 2011, after the agreement on the ‘Six-
Pack’ were the ‘real game changer’ in economic 
governance in the Euro Area, as they involved very 
specific provisions for national budgetary frameworks 
and ex-ante assessment of budgetary plans  involving 
substantial changes in the way national fiscal policy 
making has been implemented up to now. 
Nevertheless, the importance of the ‘Six-Pack’ should 
not be discounted, as it involved some important 
positive developments. In particular, the ‘Six-Pack’ 
increases focus on the debt position of member 
states; it should ensure better progress to the 
medium term budgetary objective through the new 
expenditure rule; it entails wider surveillance 
including macroeconomic imbalances; and the 
reverse majority voting system should lead to a less 
politicised process. The Directive on national 
budgetary frameworks also constituted the first step 
to decentralise fiscal governance whilst the European 
Semester was a first step towards ex-ante 
coordination of national budgets.  
 
The strength of some of these reforms is backed by 
empirical evidence and academic literature. For 
instance, fiscal consolidation tends to be more lasting 
if it is expenditure-based (Alesina and Ardagna, 
1998), which should support the use of the 
expenditure rule to monitor progress towards the 
medium-term budgetary objective. Similarly, there is 
abundant empirical evidence that fiscal performance 
tends to improve with the quality of domestic fiscal 
governance (Buti and Larch, 2011), thus providing a 
justification for the Directive on national budgetary 
frameworks. On the other hand, the effectiveness of 
other aspects of the ‘Six-Pack’ still has to be 
ascertained. In particular, the reverse majority voting 
system puts significant pressure on the European 
Commission. The process whereby a fine is imposed 
on a “friendly” sovereign state with a democratically 
elected government is a new experiment. The 
imposition of such a fine by the European 
Commission is likely to raise anti-EU sentiment in the 
population of the country concerned (Wyplosz, 
2010). So, one has to see whether the European 
Commission will have the necessary courage to 
impose such a fine. Furthermore, the surveillance of 
macroeconomic imbalances will be on the basis of 
scoreboards and peer pressure despite the fact that 
this mechanism was applied unsuccessfully in the 
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Lisbon Strategy process (Wyplosz, 2010). 
 
Concluding Remarks 
The ‘Six-Pack’ involves reforms on two fronts: 
‘hardening’ the SGP by increasing sanctions and 
imposing them at an earlier stage in the process of 
fiscal surveillance and decentralisation of fiscal 
governance through requirements for national 
budgetary frameworks. De Grauwe (2010) argues 
strongly against the first approach, since he considers 
that an approach where the European Commission is 
trying to impose discipline on reluctant sovereign 
states will not be effective. There is also an issue of 
democratic legitimacy (De Grauwe, 2010; Wyplosz, 
2010). A basic principle of our democracies is that 
you cannot have taxation without representation. In 
national elections, voters can sanction politicians for 
irresponsible fiscal behaviour (Wyplosz, 2010). A 
situation whereby European institutions can impose 
sanctions on national governments and force them to 
lower spending and/or increase taxes would thus be 
a breach of this democratic principle because these 
institutions do not face political sanctions on these 
decisions. 
 
On the other hand, the new approach introduced by 
the ‘Six-Pack’ and further developed in subsequent 
economic governance reforms of decentralisation of 
fiscal governance recognises that fiscal policy is a 
matter of national sovereignty and requires 
institutional reforms in budget rules and institutions 
at the national level (Wyplosz, 2010). This is in line 
with the principle that since decisions to spend and 
tax are taken by national governments and 
parliaments, then monitoring and control over 
excessive debts and deficits should be organised at 
national level (De Grauwe, 2010). In this sense, then 
the ‘Six-Pack’ constitutes a first small step in the right 
direction. 
 
Another option would be for a fully-fledged fiscal 
federalism with some spending and taxing decisions 
taken at EU level. In this case, in order to address the 
problem of democratic legitimacy, there would have 
to be some transfer of sovereignty from national 
parliaments to the European Parliament (Wyplosz, 
2010). At this point in time, given the political 
context, such an option is not feasible. 
 
The ‘Six-Pack’ thus has to be assessed within this 
context. The member states are not willing to go for a 
full fiscal union, but we are now closer than ever to 
this stage. A fiscal union, whatever its form, implies 
some loss of national sovereignty in fiscal policy. This 
is being implemented gradually in the EU, with the 
first step being made in the ‘Six-Pack’ and developed 
further in the economic governance reforms which 
were announced during autumn 2011.  
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